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According to the Supreme Court of Canada‟s most recent equality law ruling in 
Withler v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), considerations of context must be 
central to a discrimination analysis. As the jurisprudence evolves, discrimination 
cases in Canadian courts are becoming increasingly complex and some legal 
experts predict that we will see a rise in the number of disability rights claims. To 
date, very few cases involving women and mental health have made their way up 
to Canada‟s highest court. This paper uses a gendered analysis of disability to 
examine three Supreme Court of Canada decisions: University of British 
Columbia v. Berg (1993), Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) 
v. G. (D.F.) (1997), and Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General) (2002). The 
results indicate that in cases where gender and mental health intersect, the Court 
is unwilling or unable to deal with issues of intersectionality in order to recognize 
the gendered experience of mental illness. Yet, the Court continues to point to 
one of these cases, Gosselin, as an example of how to get the contextual 
analysis right. When it comes to women and mental health, it appears that 
equality and justice may continue to give way to decontextualization and 
stereotype. 
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Les cas de discrimination dans les cours canadiennes deviennent de plus en 
plus complexes, et quelques experts légaux prédisent que le nombre d‟actions 
légales concernant l‟handicap augmentera. Jusqu‟à présent, la Cour Suprême du 
Canada n‟a considéré que quelques cas qui impliquent les femmes et la santé 
mentale. Cet article utilisera donc une analyse engendrée de l‟handicap afin 
d‟examiner trois décisions prises par la Cour Suprême du Canada : Université de 
la Colombie-Britannique c. Berg (1993), l’Office des services à l’enfant et à la 
famille de Winnipeg (Région Nord-Ouest) c. G. (D.F.) (1997), et Gosselin c. 
Québec (Procureur général) (2002).  Les résultats indiquent que dans les cas où 
le genre et la santé mentale se croisent, la Cour Suprême soit ne veut pas, soit 
ne peut pas traiter les problèmes d‟intersectionnalité afin de reconnaître 
l‟expérience engendrée des maladies mentales. L‟analyse démontre aussi qu‟il 
semble que la Cour Suprême défend et protège ses intérêts personnels. Il paraît 
que l‟égalité et la justice sont plus faibles que la décontextualisation et les 
stéréotypes.  
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We attribute a myriad of myths and pre-conceptions to people diagnosed 
with a mental health condition. At the same time, there are factors at play that we 
do not often acknowledge: the complexities of what it means to live with a 
disability, the social stigma, and how all of these things intersect with other forms 
of oppression. 
 This paper does not attempt to deal with the legitimacy of mental illness 
nor the validity of diagnoses.1 Rather, the purpose of this paper is to critically 
examine how the Supreme Court of Canada deals with discrimination and mental 
illness and, in particular, to try and understand if, and how, gender impacts their 
analysis. This examination is broken down into the following steps: Part I 
addresses the reasons why now is an important time to look at how the Court 
deals with women and mental health; Part II attempts to contextualize women‟s 
mental health issues within an historical, Canadian context; Part III sets out an 
analytical framework for examining the Court‟s decisions; Part IV applies the 
analytical framework to three cases involving women and mental health: 
University of British Columbia v. Berg (1993), Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services v. G. (D.F.) (1997), and Gosselin v. Québec (2002); and, Part V 
attempts to briefly deal with the question of what lies ahead. The results indicate 
that in cases where gender and mental health intersect, the Court is unwilling, or 
unable, to deal with complex issues of intersectionality in order to recognize the 
gendered experience of mental illness.  
 
PART I: Why look at women and mental illness in the courts? 
 
In the wake of Withler v. Canada (2011), the time is right to reflect on equality law 
as set out in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). 
Our justice system seems most able to deal with the simple comparisons, those 
based on a binary distinction: the citizen versus the non-citizen in Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Columbia (1989), or the Deaf versus the hearing in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (1997). Discrimination analysis often requires the 
fracturing of our complex identities and the abandoning of intersectional 
understandings. Daphne Gilbert (2006) writes, the analysis “asks claimants to 
say: „it is because of my race, my gender, my religion, my nationality that I have 
suffered unequal treatment‟” (p. 227). While the Supreme Court has said that a 
discrimination claim can rest on intersecting grounds (Law v. Canada, 1999, 
para. 94), claimants are generally made to pick one aspect and focus on how that 
ground results in adverse, differential treatment when compared to others. The 
law seems able to look at one issue at a time and make a comparison, but finds it 
                                                        
1 Wording such as “mental illness” and “mental health condition” are used 
interchangeably throughout the text. Conventional language is used in this paper 
to reflect the common understanding of mental illness that inevitably underlies 
the thinking of the courts. In doing so, there is no intent to diminish in any way the 
argument that mental illness is a legally enforced social construct designed to 
pathologize and control rather than a real medical condition. Having said that, I 
am not entering the debate, nor do I have the expertise to do so.  
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difficult to deal with more complex types of discrimination. This lack of 
contextualization has been seen in the selection of grounds as well as when 
analyzing comparator groups. It has resulted in the essentialization and over-
simplification of claims (Gilbert & Majury, 2006). Two stark examples of how the 
Court has limited its comparator analysis with simplistic and detrimental results 
can be found in the cases of Hodge v. Canada (2004), an action by a common 
law spouse seeking Canada Pension Plan survivor benefits, and Auton v. British 
Columbia (2004), a case about funding for autism treatment.  
Complexity, however, is what is needed. It is the recognition of how power 
relationships interplay and inequalities co-exist simultaneously that provides real 
insight into disadvantage and discrimination (Pothier, 2001). The social context of 
distinction matters. Dianne Pothier (2001) writes, “people at the intersection of 
grounds are not just more vulnerable to discrimination, they also experience 
discrimination in different ways and/or in such a different context as to add an 
entirely new dimension to the problem” (p. 62). The Women‟s Legal Education 
and Action Fund (LEAF) agrees: 
 
Some litigants will experience multiple forms of discrimination 
simultaneously that are integral to their claim. Discrimination 
suffered on the basis of one‟s sex, Aboriginal identity and poverty, 
for example, is lived as interactive, and is neither reducible to a 
single inequality nor simply additive (2010, para. 7). 
 
Maintaining “watertight compartments”, to borrow the language of Justice 
L‟Heureux-Dube (Egan v. Canada, 1995, para. 80), is unhelpful, even harmful. In 
Withler v. Canada (2011), The Supreme Court articulates a need for the 
“flexibility required to accommodate claims based on intersecting grounds of 
discrimination” (para. 63). While it is unclear how the ruling will be applied in the 
future, it may end the rigid adherence to comparator groups and pave the way for 
a more contextual approach. But then again, it may not.  
As equality jurisprudence continues to evolve, the issues are becoming 
more complex. The prediction is that we will see an increasing amount of 
disability rights litigation (Gilbert, lecture, University of Ottawa, March 9, 2010). 
Cases in which gender and a non-visible disability intersect are particularly 
interesting. If the Court must first be able to recognize the harm in order to 
recognize any form of discrimination, what will result when part of the essence of 
the problem cannot be seen? When it comes to women and mental health, it 
seems that the courts do not recognize the gendered experience of mental 
illness. More than that, the courts are party to the perpetuation of myths about 
women and mental health.  
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PART II: How is mental health gendered? 
 
I would do anything to have breast cancer over mental illness. I would do 
anything because I [would] not have to put up with the stigma. 
— Helen Forristall 
(Senate, Standing Committee, 2006, p. 1)  
 
The experience of mental illness, like all forms of disability, will vary 
depending on whether you are a man or a woman. To better understand how 
mental health is gendered, some context is needed.  
 
Context – The Past 
 
Our culture has a deep history of pathologizing women. A striking example 
of this is the diagnosis of hysteria. Literally derived from the Greek for “uterus”, it 
was originally a psychological diagnosis given only to women and believed to be 
caused by sexual abnormality (Hamilton, 2002). Eventually, the term was used to 
label both genders, although it was still applied with much greater frequency to 
women who were thought to have physiologically weaker nerves (Hamilton, 
2002).  
While it is not a formal diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, commonly referred to as the DSM, the concept of hysteria 
still exists and is now defined as, “behavior exhibiting overwhelming or 
unmanageable fear or emotional excess” (Merriam-Webster’s, 1998, p. 572). 
Hysteria is the polar opposite of reason and rationality, and persists in Canada‟s 
courtrooms (Hamilton, 2002). Jonnette Hamilton conducted a text search of 
Canadian case law. Of the cases surveyed, she found that 80% of the people 
labeled as hysterics were female. When the term is applied to males, it is usually 
to describe minors, immigrants, and those without post-secondary education. It is 
still a feminizing term (Hamilton, 2002).  
 Another example, with deep Canadian roots, is feeble-mindedness 
(Stephen, 1995). This diagnosis was, once again, mostly applied to women. 
Aside from its misogynist underpinnings, it was clearly classist, racist, and 
ableist. Indicators of this “disorder” were tied to family history and heredity, when 
a person started walking and talking as an infant, morality and sexual behaviour, 
the onset of menstruation, employment history, standardized intelligence test 
scores, and even the presence of a cleft pallet. The diagnosis of feeble-
mindedness was used to legally justify community and institutional supervision as 
well as deportation (Stephen, 1995). 
 
Context – The Present 
 
What does it mean to be a woman with a mental health disability today? These 
statistics provide context for the analysis that follows: 
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 Women are twice as likely as men to be at risk of depression (Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Women, 2006); 
 Doctors are more likely to diagnose depression in women who 
present with symptoms identical to those of men (World Health 
Organization, n.d.); 
 Women are more likely than men to be prescribed psychotropic 
drugs (WHO, n.d.);  
 31% of women in federal penitentiaries report emotional or mental 
health problems compared to 15% of federally incarcerated men 
(Riordan, 2004); 
 Women with serious mental illness are more likely to be 
unemployed and live in poverty (Canadian Mental Health 
Association, 2005); 
 One study found that 83% of women in an inpatient psychiatric 
hospital had been physically or sexually abused in childhood 
(Morrow, 2002); 
 Women are three to four times more likely to attempt suicide than 
men, and there is also a significant correlation with a history of 
sexual abuse (Pollett, n.d.);  
 Life events that cause “a sense of loss, inferiority, humiliation or 
entrapment” are predictors of depression (WHO, n.d.); and, 
 The risk factors that impact women‟s mental health include: sexual 
and violence, socioeconomic disadvantage, income inequality, 
poverty and hunger, subordinate social status, and responsibility for 
the care of others (Pollett, n.d.; WHO, n.d.). 
 
Sadly, it is possible to summarize all of the above facts by stating that the 
experience of gender oppression, along with other forms of subordination, are 
major predictors of mental illness.  
 These truths are rarely recognized. Instead, women must face the realities 
listed above along with the myths and stereotypes built on a history of oppressive 
ignorance. Susan Wendell (1996) writes about how society contributes to the 
disabling of people by misconstruing what it means to have a disability. This 
process of othering occurs in two ways: firstly, through omitting the real, lived 
experiences of people with disabilities from social discourse; and secondly, 
through stereotyping. This stereotyping is characterized by the following: 
 
selective stigmatization of physical and mental limitations and other 
differences…the numerous cultural meanings attached to various 
kinds of disability and illness, and the exclusion of people with 
disabilities from the cultural meanings of activities they cannot 
perform or are expected not to perform (pp. 42-43). 
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PART III: What is “a legal theory of gendered disability”? 
 
I can never experience gender discrimination other than as a person with a 
disability; 
 I can never experience disability discrimination other than as a woman.  
I cannot disaggregate myself nor can anyone who might be discriminating 
against me. 
— Dianne Pothier (2001, p. 59). 
 
Dianne Pothier (2001) describes the interrelationship between gender and 
disability: 
 
I can never experience gender discrimination other than as a 
person with a disability; I can never experience disability 
discrimination other than as a woman. I cannot disaggregate myself 
nor can anyone who might be discriminating against me. I do not fit 
into discrete boxes of grounds of discrimination. Even when only 
one ground of discrimination seems to be relevant, it affects me as 
a whole person. If I am excluded or marginalized from something 
because of my disability, I am also excluded or marginalized as a 
woman and vice versa (p. 59). 
 
An acknowledgment of the interplay between gender and disability is critical 
to informing an equality analysis of the kind and degree of discrimination women 
with mental health disabilities face.2 To do this, we can look to Fiona Sampson 
(2005) for a framework of what she calls, “A Legal Theory of Gendered 
Disability”. Sampson explains this approach as follows:  
 
Gendered disability is not the “additive” experience involving a 
multiplicity of relations of subordination. The relations that inform 
this experience are non-divisible…Gendered disability is an 
experience in which the identity features of gender and disability are 
fused together in such a way as to create a specific experience, 
distinct from other lived experiences (p. 4).  
 
In other words, it is the confluence of factors that defines the unique character of 
the discrimination, and not simply a number of separate and distinct elements of 
                                                        
2 I am aware that in talking about women and disability and mental illness, I am 
using language that may universalize experiences and mask difference, 
something that must be acknowledged in a paper that is attempting to look at 
issues of intersection and respect for contextualization. I do this, however, to limit 
the scope of the discussion, not to discount the ways in which an individual‟s 
experience is shaped by myriad factors (see Wendell, 1996). 
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disadvantage that add up to result in oppression (Razack, 1998). Not only does 
an additive approach not account for the dynamics at play in systemic 
oppression, the additional danger is that elements can also be subtracted in an 
analysis, both reducing the nature of a discriminatory act into something far more 
simplistic and less insidious, and essentializing the identity of the claimant. 
Sampson (2005) writes that it is “impossible to dissect an experience such as 
gendered disability discrimination into neat, separate categories of gender and/or 
disability, just as it is impossible to dissect the claimant into neat, separate 
components of gender and/or disability” (p. 45). 
 Sampson (2005) does not purport to create a gendered disability legal 
theory. Instead, building on a mix of disability theory, feminist legal theory and 
critical race theory, she works to “initiate the preliminary steps in the development 
of a theory…by exploring the nature and extent of the subordination of disabled 
women within both society and the law” (p. 94). 
 Through detailed analysis of case law, Sampson (2005) demonstrates that 
the distinctive and gendered nature of discrimination and disability is not 
something the Supreme Court has been able to perceive. She finds a lack of 
judicial consciousness with respect to gendered disability: either gender or 
disability is brought to the foreground in a claim, one serving as the basis for the 
equality analysis and thereby rendering the other useless in the Court‟s view. 
Because of this, she concludes that claims made by women with disabilities are 
less likely to succeed in comparison to claims made by women without a 
disability or men with a disability (Sampson, 2005). 
 Sampson (2005) identifies four factors that influence how a court may 
approach a disability rights claim: 
 
[T]he kind of disability at issue, the context within which the claim is 
advanced, the degree of risk that the women with disabilities will get 
subsumed within the category of the essential, non-disabled 
woman, and the cost attached to remedying the discrimination (p. 
407).  
 
I use Sampson‟s factors to pose the following questions for analysis: 
 
 What is the nature of the disability? In other words, what kind of 
mental illness is at issue? 
 Is the disability eclipsed by gender, or vice versa, and what impact 
does this have on the Court‟s approach? 
 How does the severity, or perceived severity, of the disability impact 
the outcome? 
 Is the source and effect of the discrimination addressed? 
 Does the Court engage in any contextualization with respect to the 
person‟s circumstances?  
 What myths and stereotypes, if any, are at play? For example, does 
the Court buy into any of the following mischaracterizations of 
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women with mental illness: oversexed, dangerous, infantilized, 
feeble-minded, malingerer, unruly, etc.? 
 Whose interests is the Court protecting? 
 
Not all of these questions may be answered with respect to every case, but 
they should generally lead to some findings about whether the Court is able 
to perceive any degree of gendered disability in its approach.  
 
PART IV: How has the Supreme Court dealt with women and mental illness? 
 
What follows is an examination of three cases dealing with women who 
are seen to have some form of mental illness: University of British Columbia v. 
Berg (1993), Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.) (1997), and 
Gosselin v. Québec (2002). I present the cases in chronological order, but 
because so few cases dealing with the discrimination of women with mental 
illness have been heard by the Supreme Court, it is not really possible to 
determine if there is any progression in the analysis of the Court.  
 
1. University of British Columbia v. Berg  
 
This case started as a claim before the British Columbia Human Rights 
Council and worked its way up to the Supreme Court on judicial review (Berg, 
1987). Two things are striking about this case. The first is how the tribunal 
decision is able to so effectively decontextualize the claim. The second is how, 
even after the Supreme Count finds in the claimant‟s favour reversing the 
decisions of the two courts below, it is made clear that the discrimination was 
seen to be justified, if not legal, based on the stereotypical myth of the 
dangerous, deranged woman.3 
Janice Berg was a university student enrolled in a Master‟s program at the 
University of British Columbia School of Family and Nutritional Sciences. She 
was a good student who dreamed of becoming a dietitian. Berg‟s academic 
performance was above average and she was awarded a National Research 
Council Scholarship (UBC, 1993, para. 2). Despite these achievements, Berg 
was typecast by her program administrators and the courts, not based on her 
qualifications, but based on her mental health issues and the events of a single 
day.  
In the fall of 1981, an “incident” occurred. Stressed about a meeting with a 
faculty member, Berg wrote the words “I am dead” on a campus washroom 
mirror. Fearing the presence of security personnel and police who had been 
called in because of the writing, Berg ran into a classroom and attempted to jump 
through a window to get away (Berg, 1987, para. 36236). This “incident” led to a 
change in attitude toward Berg and served as an excuse for the school‟s 
discriminatory treatment.  
                                                        
3 I am using pejorative language to reflect pejorative sentiments based on myth 
and stereotype.  
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At the tribunal level, Berg put forward eight separate complaints of 
discrimination: 
 
1. That she was excluded from faculty activities; 
2. That she was harassed during the oral defence of her thesis; 
3. That the department disclosed her mental illness to a prospective 
employer; 
4. That adverse decisions about her were made at faculty meetings; 
5. That she was denied enrolment in two courses; 
6. That she was denied computer funds; 
7. That she was denied a key to access the faculty building; and, 
8. That she was denied a rating sheet required for registration in an 
internship program (Berg, 1987, para. 36239). 
 
All of the complaints, with the exception of the last two, are dismissed 
(Berg, 1987). Part of the reason is that the tribunal parcels out the claims made 
against the university into what it sees as separate and distinct issues, thus 
failing to see the discrimination in any kind of full context. In the name of clarity, a 
myopic approach is taken, rather than an examination of the structural and 
systemic nature of the problems as well as the total impact on the claimant. 
Of the complaints that are dismissed, two in particular deserve closer 
scrutiny because of the interests at stake: the denial of Berg‟s enrolment in two 
courses, and the disclosure of confidential health information to a prospective 
employer.  
 Berg attempted to take two classes, Home Economics and Agricultural 
Economics, neither of which were necessary for her Master‟s degree but were 
required for an internship (Berg, 1987, paras. 36242, 36275). No discrimination 
was found, and Berg was eventually able to take both courses (Berg, 1987, para. 
36284). The adjudicator seems to easily find that testimony of faculty members 
does not support Berg‟s claim. But, Dr. Oberg, the Associate Dean of Graduate 
Studies, is earlier cited as saying, “that „faculty‟ felt the complainant should „get 
on‟ with her Masters program rather than become involved with extra courses” 
(Berg, 1987, para. 36257). This demonstrates that there was pervasive ill 
sentiment toward Berg, that the school wanted to be rid of her, and that there 
was a willingness to take measures that would impact on her long-term ambitions 
and well-being.  
The same reasoning can be found in the dismissal of Berg‟s complaint 
about disclosure of her personal health information to a potential employer. No 
discrimination was found. Why? Because in the end, Berg did get a position with 
the employer, albeit an inferior one, and because of concerns about the accuracy 
of the evidence regarding exactly who spoke to whom (Berg, 1987, para. 36281). 
Yet, the employer testified that Berg‟s thesis advisor “indicated the complainant 
had „mental health problems‟”. He said that because of this information Berg was 
hired as a researcher instead of a project coordinator (Berg, 1987, para. 36256). 
The thesis advisor also recalled discussing Berg‟s “health problems”, although 
not directly with the person doing the hiring (Berg, 1987, para. 36281). The 
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tribunal finds that this is not enough; the evidence is faulty and, therefore, the 
discrimination unsupported.  
In essence, what appears to be happening here is a systemic exercise to 
protect the faculty from being associated with guilt, conscious or otherwise. 
Sheila McIntyre (2000) writes about how people in positions of privilege are able 
to evade having to account for knowledge of systemic inequality. What may have 
happened in Berg‟s case is an invocation of the “due-process” paradigm. The 
focus was shifted from the content and context of the allegations to a narrow 
focus on process leading to heightened evidentiary scrutiny (McIntyre, 2000). In 
this way, it was easier for evidence to be viewed as flawed and the perpetrators 
of inequality to remain innocent. The Supreme Court does not question any of 
this and instead seems even less willing to challenge the actions of the faculty 
(UBC, 1993).  
At both the tribunal and Supreme Court, the source of the discrimination is 
never fully addressed. The “incident” served as a convenient excuse for the 
faculty‟s discriminatory acts, but the department did not make efforts to undertake 
any kind of real risk assessment until challenged because they denied Berg a key 
(Berg, 1987, para. 36262). The school‟s director, Dr. Rogers, admitted that he 
had “„very little‟ knowledge” of Berg‟s actual health condition (Berg, 1987, para. 
36287). The evidence presents a very different picture when compared to the 
stereotypical assumptions made about the nature of her disability. She had no 
history of injuring herself or damaging university property (Berg, 1987, para. 
36288). Despite this evidence, Chief Justice Lamer says that Dr. Rogers‟s 
concerns may have been reasonable because of the incident (UBC, 1993, para. 
92). 
Berg had depression, which was viewed by the courts as severe, and she, 
in turn, was seen as dangerous. The tribunal adjudicator‟s reasons indicate that 
the respondent‟s counsel worked to play up the myths associated with mental 
illness. The reference to the fact that Berg would not agree with counsel “that she 
was alleging a „conspiracy‟” indicates that attempts may have been made to 
portray her as paranoid (Berg, 1987, para. 36238). 
There seems to be a pervasive view that women with mental illness are 
more dangerous than their male counterparts. The courts may be reinforcing this 
myth. Take, for example, Starson v. Swayze (2003), the leading case on capacity 
and consent to treatment. This time, the Supreme Court deals with the person at 
its centre, a man, far more respectfully than Berg. The Court ultimately 
determines that he is capable making his own treatment decisions. The judgment 
even goes so far as to use Starson‟s unearned title of professor and false name 
throughout the decision--his real name is Scott Jeffery Schutzman and he has no 
claim to any academic title. The Court notes that Starson, a man diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder, had been admitted to hospital after being found not criminally 
responsible for uttering death threats, but also that he had never caused harm to 
himself or others (para. 66). It is as if in UBC v. Berg the Court imputes 
dangerousness out of next to nothing, while in Starson v. Swayze it seems to 
diminish serious threatening behaviour to near nothingness.   
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The impact of the discrimination on Berg is never addressed by the 
tribunal, nor by the Supreme Court. The tribunal acknowledges “indignity, 
humiliation, embarrassment and injury to feelings of self-respect” (Berg, 1987, 
para. 36298), but it never addresses the possible long-term effects. The 
department‟s actions--denying rating sheets and courses for internships, notifying 
prospective employers about personal medical matters, and limiting her access 
to university facilities--were potentially devastating to her career, which in turn 
would impact Berg‟s future income, economic well-being, and life circumstances. 
Berg does win a partial victory at both the tribunal and the Supreme Court. 
Still, the Court goes to great lengths to point out in its decision that the verdict 
was in her favour not because this was the just result, but because the legislative 
scheme left them no alternative; there was no statutory defence that the 
university could use to justify its actions. Chief Justice Lamer writes, “I believe 
that the School and its representatives acted in good faith, and thought that there 
were good reasons for acting as they did” (UBC, 1993, para. 92). 
Whose interests is the Court protecting? It is hard to say. Chief Justice 
Lamer talks about “competing interests, such as safety” (UBC, 1993, para. 92). 
We know from the evidence that this concern about safety is built on stereotype. 
There seems to be a general interest in maintaining a right to exclude those 
whom the able norm finds uncomfortably different. UBC v. Berg is notable in 
terms of human rights jurisprudence for defining the term “public” and the phrase 
“customarily available to the public”. Perhaps the root of the issue is a desire to 
keep disability in the private sphere of responsibility (Wendell, 1996). Maybe, at 
some level, it is about ensuring those with privilege continue to be able to 
determine who is afforded mobility and status and who is not.  
 
2. Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.) 
 
D.F.G. was a young indigenous woman. At 22 years old, G. was pregnant 
with her fourth child. She was also addicted to solvents and two of her children 
had already been made wards of the state. Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
(WCFS) took her to court when she was five months pregnant. WCFS sought an 
order compelling G. to submit to institutional care and undergo treatment for the 
remainder of her pregnancy (WCFS, 1997). 
What makes this case most interesting is the fact that the evidence 
indicates G. did not actually have a mental illness. Two psychiatrists testified that 
she was mentally competent and not mentally ill (LEAF, 1997, para. 4; WCFS, 
1996, paras. 13 16). It is the trial judge, Justice Schulman, who declares that G. 
has a “mental disorder” when ordering her committal under the province‟s Mental 
Health Act (WCFS, 1996, para. 21). This finding is made despite the fact that 
WCFS‟s statement of claim makes no mention of the Mental Health Act (LEAF, 
1997, para. 5). 
In effect, this case is an example of a modern day diagnosis of feeble-
mindedness. The trial judge imputes mental illness to G. to justify forced 
institutional supervision and treatment. The Court‟s reasons make repeated 
reference to her sexual behaviour and unstable lifestyle (WCFS, 1996, paras. 10, 
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11, 16). By doing this, Justice Schulman brings disability to the foreground to 
justify the denial of G.‟s autonomy and rights over her own body. Gender equality 
becomes a background issue--to the degree possible, given that the case deals 
specifically with pregnancy.  
Sampson (2005) points out that the bodies of women with disabilities are 
“especially susceptible to coercion” through objectification (p. 410). The more 
othered they are, the less resistance there may be to denial of their rights. 
Pregnancy has served as an historical pretext for women‟s disadvantage (LEAF, 
1997, para. 37). “Coercion and force” are recast as “help and care” for those 
portrayed as vulnerable (LEAF, 1997, para. 50). WCFS premises its application 
to institutionalize G. on the need to protect her directly, not the fetus (WCFS, 
1996, para. 34).  
 The majority of the Supreme Court sees the inherent inequalities of 
regulating the bodies of pregnant women. Gender comes to the foreground and 
the Court is able to apply an analysis that accounts for women‟s autonomy over 
their bodies. It does not address issues of disability; it does not have to.  
Yet, the Court is still unable to do a full contextual analysis to account for 
intersecting oppression. The decision does not acknowledge that G. is an 
indigenous woman. The word “aboriginal” appears seven times in the text of the 
decision, but never with reference to G. (WCFS, 1997). The effect of this is to 
eliminate the impact of racism and colonialism from the equality equation. It 
appears that this exclusion was conscious given that LEAF‟s submissions to the 
Court emphasized the need for a contextual analysis accounting for social and 
historical oppression (LEAF, 1997, paras. 8-13). 
Before we congratulate the Court for at least arriving at the right outcome, 
it is worth noting that Justices Sopinka and Major would have restored the trial 
judgment (WCFS, 1997, para. 142). 
 
3. Gosselin v. Québec  
 
Louise Gosselin‟s judicial odyssey spanned over three decades. In 1984, 
the Quebec government changed the province‟s social assistance scheme, 
drastically reducing welfare rates for people under the age of 30. At that time, a 
person 30 or over would receive $466 per month, an amount already recognized 
as inadequate to live above the poverty line. People under 30 got just a fraction 
of that, $170 per month (Gosselin, 2002, para. 7). Young people could try to raise 
the amount they received by participating in workfare-type training and education 
programs. Not everyone could take part due to space constraints and other 
access issues, and participation still seldom resulted in a top-up on par with 
those people in the older age bracket. Gosselin was one of these young people. 
And, on behalf of 75,000 recipients, she challenged the social assistance scheme 
under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Gosselin, 2002, para. 4). 
 As a young adult, Gosselin alternately worked various jobs and received 
social assistance from 1984 to 1989. She had a history of foster homes and 
physical and psychological health issues: “As a woman with a low income, she 
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has struggled to survive socially, emotionally, and economically” (Brodsky, Cox, 
Day, & Stephenson, 2006, p. 194). Justice Bastarache notes in dissent that 
Gosselin had a difficult life that led to alcohol abuse, suicide attempts, and 
depression (Gosselin, 2002, para. 164). It even led to prostitution: food and 
shelter in exchange for sex (Gosselin, 1992, para. 64). 
The Supreme Court splits 5:4. It is the myth of the malingerer that wins 
out, not Gosselin, and not the 75,000 young people in Quebec whose 
disadvantage and economic subordination were exacerbated by the province‟s 
welfare policies.  
This case is a stark example of the Court‟s lack of contextualization. It is 
more than just inability to see the layered issues and may be better described as 
clear unwillingness on the part of the majority. Chief Justice McLaughlin narrows 
the scope of the claim to be strictly about age, in what seems to be an overt 
refusal to engage in any kind of an intersectional analysis (Gosselin, 2002, para. 
35). Had the majority taken the claim to be on behalf of “young social assistance 
recipients” as compared to members of society in general, as Justice Bastarache 
articulates in his dissenting reasons (Gosselin, 2002, para. 236), it might have 
resulted in a more contextual analysis with some consideration of the factors that 
lead to poverty, including disability in all its forms. As the Women‟s Court of 
Canada points out, “it is necessary to deal with poverty as a manifestation of sex, 
race, and disability discrimination. Entrenched patterns of systemic discrimination 
are a central cause of poverty” (Brodsky et al., 2006, p. 219). By failing to do this, 
the Court never addresses the sources of discrimination, and it never deals with 
the fact that mental illness means women, like Gosselin, are more likely to be 
unemployed and live in poverty (CMHA, 2005). Troublingly, the Supreme Court 
cites Gosselin in Withler v. Canada as an example of a “contextual inquiry” 
(2011, para. 47).  
While I am reluctant to use strong language for fear that I will fall into the 
historically-gendered trap of pathologizing Gosselin, the fact is that she had been 
suicidal and even hospitalized at one point (Gosselin, 2002, paras. 165, 169). 
Yet, the words “disability”, “mental disability”, or “mental illness” are never used 
with reference to Gosselin in the Supreme Court‟s decision. There is a general 
recognition of Gosselin‟s “psychological problems”, to use the Court‟s language 
(Gosselin, 2002, paras. 1, 8, 48, 164), but the extent of these problems is 
consistently downplayed by the majority. As Sampson (2005) points out, the 
perception of a mild disability can be just as damning as the perception of a 
severe disability for a claimant: 
  
The more severe the claimant‟s disability, the less likely it seems 
that the claim will succeed, while a claimant with a seemingly mild 
disability may be disrespected by the judiciary so that claim will also 
fail...[A] person with a mild disability may be considered a 
malingerer and not entitled to accommodation and equality rights 
protection” (pp. 411-412).  
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Gosselin‟s mental health disability simply is not disability enough for the harm to 
be recognized. While she was able to get a medical certificate for a disability 
increase in 1986, Gosselin was usually considered “able-bodied” and given the 
reduced welfare rate (Gosselin, 2002, paras. 168-169). This speaks to a 
legislative trend of narrowing definitions of disability for benefits and, at the same 
time, making it more difficult for people to qualify for such support (Brodsky et al., 
2006). 
 Instead of recognizing these realities, Chief Justice McLaughlin bases her 
reasons on the stereotype of the young and lazy, “of young people as 
freeloaders--unwilling to seek education or job training unless coerced” (Brodsky 
et al., 2006, p. 190). If anything, the Chief Justice says that the fact Gosselin 
participated in welfare-related programs at all demonstrates that “even individuals 
with serious problems were capable of supplementing their income under the 
impugned regime” (Gosselin, 2002, para. 48). 
At most, Gosselin‟s situation provokes “sympathy” from Chief Justice 
McLaughlin (Gosselin, 2002, para. 19). This is also problematic. As Razack 
(1998) writes, pity is an emotional response to the vulnerability of those who are 
othered that leads to neither respect nor “a willingness to change the conditions 
that hurt people with disabilities” (p. 138). Instead, this sentiment allows people to 
deny any implication they have in the systemic oppression of people with 
disabilities and, therefore, any role they might have in progressive change. 
The majority never recognizes the effects of the discrimination, that being 
the perpetuation of disadvantage for the most disadvantaged in Quebec and the 
exacerbation of disabilities like mental illness. Both Justices L'Heureux-Dubé and 
Arbour recognize this in their dissents: Justice Arbour writes, “The hardships and 
marginalization of poverty propel the individual into a spiral of isolation, 
depression, humiliation, low self-esteem, anxiety, stress and drug addiction” 
(Gosselin, 2002, paras.130, 376). 
Sampson (2005) notes that when the interests on the table are 
government spending versus economic equality, the deck may be stacked 
against the claimant with a disability from the start. Indeed, Chief Justice 
McLaughlin makes no pretense regarding the Court‟s perspective on the 
magnitude of this issue early in the decision while at the same time expressing 
doubt about the public interest in any potential remedy. She writes: 
 
On her submissions, this would mean ordering the government to 
pay almost $389 million in benefits plus the interest accrued since 
1985. Ms. Gosselin claims this remedy on behalf of over 75 000 
unnamed class members, none of whom came forward in support 
of her claim (Gosselin, 2002, para. 4). 
 
Besides, she notes, the purpose of the scheme is not to exclude, but rather to 
“integrate her into the workforce and to promote her long-term self-sufficiency” 
(Gosselin, 2002, para. 19). Government purpose trumps effects and gendered 
disability loses again.  
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PART V: What does this mean as we move forward? 
 
[T]he stories of women with disabilities must be told, 
not as stories of vulnerability, but as stories of injustice 
— Sherene Razack (1998, p. 156) 
 
The case law paints a disheartening picture. In place of a contextualized 
approach that seeks to understand the distinctive and gendered nature of 
discrimination and mental illness, decontextualization mixed with myth and 
stereotype prevail. The judiciary appears unable to contemplate or appreciate 
what women like Janice Berg, D.F.G., and Louise Gosselin must face. Instead, 
Berg becomes the dangerous and deranged woman who threatens society‟s 
safety; G. becomes the feeble-minded incompetent who must be locked up; and 
Gosselin becomes the malingerer who is well enough to pull herself up by her 
bootstraps and make do. What the courts do is “reproduce the discrimination that 
informs the social construction of gendered disability” (Sampson, 2005, p. 432). 
Fairness and justice are absent for women who are labeled as mentally ill.  
 In fact, the oppression that these three women experienced cannot be 
separated from the use, and social acceptance, of concepts like “mental illness” 
and related gender-based labels. Thomas Szasz would have described these 
labels as a “smokescreen” (1990, p. 363); the premise allows the courts to ignore 
gender issues and objectify, dehumanize, and dismiss rather than engage in the 
complex analysis required to understand the societal and historical factors 
involved.  
 But, if the predictions are correct and more disability rights cases will be 
appearing before the courts, then what are advocates to do? Is it possible to work 
toward unthinking the discriminatory reasoning, as Sampson puts it (2005, p. 
433)? 
 Yes, it is possible, but difficult. Just as Sampson (2005) presents us with 
the problem, she also presents us with a solution. Pointing to the work done by 
feminists to instill the judiciary with an understanding of how a social construction 
of gender impacts sexual assault, it may be possible to begin to do the same 
regarding a gendered disability analysis (Sampson, 2005, p. 432). Of course, this 
does not imply that the courts have a full understanding in terms of gender and 
sexual assault. Old stereotypes have a way of rearing their ugly heads, as 
demonstrated in the recent case of R. v. Rhodes (2011), in which the sexual 
assault victim‟s provocative dress was seen as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
(para. 519). Still, overall, there has at least been some recognition of the myths at 
play in these kinds of cases and ongoing efforts to extract them from legal 
reasoning. It‟s a start.  
Gendered disability analysis has a lot of catching up to do. Perceived by 
some as the last civil rights movement, it was just in its infancy when section 15 
of the Charter took effect (Rosenbaum & Chadha, 2006). It will take time to 
overcome the myths and stereotypes that have taken hold and undo decades of 
decontextualized judicial reasoning and case law that reinforces discrimination. 
The Court‟s recent iteration in Withler v. Canada (2011) on the importance of a 
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contextual inquiry may be cause for some cautious hope. But, the Court has yet 
to prove itself able to engage in the sophisticated analysis required in these kinds 
of cases. One thing is certain: we have a long way to go. Our society and our 
courts must learn to see the injustices women with mental illness face.   
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